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Sponsoring Corruption
PAMMELA S. QUINN†

ABSTRACT
By reference to a detailed analysis of recent major
corruption scandals that have plagued the IOC and
FIFA, this Article examines the ways in which large
multi-national corporate sponsors sometimes exercise
private regulatory authority in the international sports
arena. Through their contract relationships with
sporting organizations, corporate sponsors potentially
have the capacity to act as strong regulators. When
major corruption scandals have emerged, sponsors
have taken a variety of actions that run the gamut from
tepid criticism to withdrawing from the sponsoring
arrangements. Yet, they ultimately have been far less
effective regulators than one might expect given their
financial importance to the international sports
organizations with which they are affiliated.
Ultimately, various structural obstacles appear to
stand in the way of corporations fulfilling their full
potential to exert strong influence.
INTRODUCTION
Scandal dogs sport at every level: from very young Little League
players who are accused of lying about their ages;1 to the perennial
charges of players being illegally paid to play at the collegiate level;2
© 2017 Pammela S. Quinn.
†
Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law
1. See, e.g., Dan Le Batard, Little League Cheating Scandal, ESPN THE MAGAZINE
(Dec. 24, 2001), http://www.espn.com/espn/news/story?page=Mag15detour.
2. See, e.g., Dave Davies, NPR, Fresh Air: The Illegal Procedure of Paying College
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and the ongoing controversy over the National Football League’s
handling of scientific evidence regarding concussion risks,3 which has
recently given rise not only to troubling news stories but also to a major
Hollywood movie. There is simply no escaping major controversy
when high-profile sporting events and personalities are involved. Yet,
while scandal may always seem to go hand in glove with high-profile
sports, the international sports arena in particular appears to be
perpetually rife with serious problems at the very highest levels.
Stories of major corruption scandals involving international sporting
events seem to arise with nearly as much frequency as stories about the
events and athletes themselves.
The plague of corruption infecting the highest levels of
international sports organizations and events may be directly
attributable to the fact that such organizations are operating beyond the
national plane. As is true with respect to transnational enterprises more
generally, the transnational/trans-regulatory nature of international
sports makes them far more complicated and challenging to regulate
than is the case for similar organizations that operate in a purely
domestic context. While “political entities … [have traditionally] had
a virtual monopoly over economic regulation, each in their own
territor[ies],”4 when people or entities cross borders and becomes
international in their scope, regulatory efforts become difficult for any
one state to control. As a result, “public law, as either substantive rules
or as systems of governance, has proven increasingly unable to
respond efficiently to the problems of [transnational] governance.”5
Private regulation—the regulation of one private entity by
another—has emerged in the academic literature as a potential solution
to this regulatory dilemma. This notion found its way into comedian
John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight segment about the corruption scandal
that plagued the Fédération Internationale de Football Association
Athletes (aired Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/28/148610494/the-illegalprocedure-of-paying-college-athletes (reviewing JAMES DALE & JOSH LUCHS, ILLEGAL
PROCEDURE: A SPORTS AGENT COMES CLEAN ON THE DIRTY BUSINESS OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL
(2012)).
3. See Jeanne Marie Laskas, Bennet Omalu, Concussions and the NFL: How One
Doctor Changed Football Forever, GQ (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.gq.com/story/nflplayers-brain-dementia-study-memory-concussions; see also Lauren Larson, Watch Will
Smith Take On the NFL in This Chilling Trailer for Concussion, GQ (Aug. 31, 2015)
http://www.gq.com/story/trailer-concussion-will-smith.
4. Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of
Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1743
(2007).
5. Id. at 1745.
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(“FIFA”) in 2015.6 Oliver called upon the organization’s corporate
sponsors to take action and force the resignation of FIFA President
Joseph “Sepp” Blatter. Perhaps only half-jokingly he referred to the
organization’s corporate sponsors as “the only group even more
powerful than world government.”7
Indeed, FIFA’s sponsors include some of the largest multinational enterprises in the world, including Coca-Cola, Budweiser,
Adidas, and Hyundai/Kia. While traditionally viewed as subjects of
regulation, large multi-national corporations also possess enormous
potential to wield regulatory authority over FIFA and other
international sporting bodies and events that they sponsor.
And occasionally they have harnessed this power. The John
Hancock Life Insurance Company was a worldwide Olympics sponsor
in the 1990s.8 When a bidding scandal over the 2002 Salt Lake City
Games emerged, the company’s CEO David D’Alessandro demanded
that International Olympics Committee (“IOC”) President Juan
Antonio Samaranch resign.9 D’Alessandro believes that his measures
were directly responsible for the IOC’s becoming more transparent at
the time.10
With respect to the recent FIFA scandal, too, some sponsors did
do as Oliver suggested. Corporate sponsors serve as a major source of
cash for FIFA, which earned $1.6 billion from sponsorship money in
6. After allegations of corruption emerged in the selection of host countries for two
upcoming World Cups, dozens of FIFA executives, including those at the very top of the
organization, were investigated by the FBI and eventually indicted by the Justice Department
between May and December 2015. See, e.g., Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered,
BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066. The BBC
article noted that while DOJ’s “investigation was initially sparked by the bidding process for
the Russia 2018 and Qatar 2022 World Cups,” it was eventually “widened to look back at
Fifa’s dealings over the past 20 years.” Id. FIFA’s selection of Qatar has also come under
attack given the human rights problems emerging there. Shona Gosh, Why FIFA’s Sponsors
Haven’t Quit, PR WEEK (June 2, 2015), http://www.prweek.com/article/1349704/why-fifassponsors-havent-quit#YIxmy5wQWdUX095V.99 (“Its selection of Qatar as the 2022 World
Cup host has also been heavily criticized after hundreds of migrant workers were revealed to
have died during stadium construction work.”).
7. See Lisa de Moraes, John Oliver Vows To Drink Bud Light Lime If World Cup
Sponsors Boot FIFA Chief – Update, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (June 1, 2015),
http://deadline.com/2015/06/john-oliver-fifa-sepp-blatter-budweiser-world-cup-last-weektonight-video-1201435345/.
8. Richard Sandomir, Sponsors React Meekly to Sepp Blatter’s Resignation, N.Y. TIMES
(June 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/sports/soccer/sponsors-react-meeklyto-sepp-blatters-resignation.html?_r=0.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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the four-years leading up to the 2014 World Cup.11 Nearly half of its
money comes from just six top sponsoring companies, two of which
(Sony and Emirates) ended their sponsorships in 2014 during a flurry
of bad press surrounding the corruption allegations.12
On the other hand, most IOC and FIFA sponsors are more notable
for their lack of response to these corruption scandals. Even with
respect to those that did take action, their responses are not necessarily
very effective. In the case of Sony and Emirates, the companies did not
even mention the corruption scandal directly in announcing their
decisions not to renew sponsorship deals. Further, the impact of their
departures are mooted by other competitors’ jumping in to take their
spots.13 And other major sponsors, such as Visa and Coca-Cola, who
made public statements calling on FIFA to take action, took no
financial action or other steps that might have exerted real pressure in
connection with their sponsorship roles.
Using case studies of corruption and corporate sponsor responses
to scandals in the IOC and FIFA, this Article considers broadly how
and when corporate sponsors effectively serve as private regulators of
11. Mike Esterl, FIFA’s Corporate Sponsors Welcome Resignation of Sepp Blatter,
WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fifas-corporate-sponsors-welcomeresignation-of-sepp-blatter-1433277626 (“Sponsors also spend money on TV ads on networks
around the world that air soccer matches. Overall, FIFA took in $5.72 billion in the 2014
cycle.”).
12. Id. Sony terminated its sponsorship worth $277 million “saying the expense of
sponsorship may become a burden in the future for the technology company.” Polly Mosendz,
Sony Drops FIFA Sponsorship Amid Corruption Scandal, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.newsweek.com/sony-drops-fifa-sponsorship-amid-corruption-scandal-288443.
Emirates indicated that it would be interested in renewing its sponsorship deal once the
corruption issues had been dealt with. Emirates Keen on Sponsoring Fifa Once Corruption
Scandal
Is
Cleared
Up,
THE
NATIONAL
(June
21,
2016),
http://www.thenational.ae/business/aviation/emirates-keen-on-sponsoring-fifa-oncecorruption-scandal-is-cleared-up (“‘I’d like to think that when it’s all sorted out we get back
in because it’s great for us, we’re so football orientated,’ [Emirates President] said.”). Other
“second-tier” sponsors followed suit. Owen Gibson, Scandal-Hit FIFA Loses Three More
Major
Sponsors,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
23,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jan/23/fifa-lose-three-sponsors-castrolcontinental-tyres-johnson-and-johnson (“Three of FIFA’s sponsors during the 2014 World
Cup in Brazil have joined Sony and Emirates in declining to renew their contracts with the
scandal-hit world governing body. Castrol, Continental Tyres and Johnson & Johnson – socalled second-tier sponsors that had a high-profile presence in Brazil – have confirmed they
have not renewed their deals.”).
13. As of July 2015, Qatar Airways reported that it was in latter stages of negotiating a
sponsorship agreement with FIFA (as a replacement for Emirates). Aaron Flanagan, Qatar
Airways Still Plan World Cup Sponsorship Despite Revelations of Alleged FIFA Corruption,
MIRROR (June 2, 2015), http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/qatar-airways-still-planworld-5808056.
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corruption in international sports. The Article also describes many of
the obstacles that currently stand in the way of effective regulation by
corporate sponsors. After examining the literature considering private
regulation in the transnational/international sphere generally, the
Article considers what factors may have encouraged sponsors to
engage in regulatory responses and discouraged others from behaving
similarly. The Article concludes with thoughts about the overall
potential of private regulation to help stem corruption in international
sports organizations, despite some serious limitations.
I. THE RISE OF PRIVATE REGULATION
Legal regulation is often viewed as primarily within the purview
of public lawmakers. Yet, as crossing borders becomes routine and
globalization becomes the norm, regulation becomes difficult for
public actors to control effectively. As a result, “public law, as either
substantive rules or as systems of governance, has proven increasingly
unable to respond efficiently to the problems of the governance of
economic relations.”14 The result is that “[a] diverse group of actors
today vie with national governments for the right to exert power and
authority . . . . Of these, the modern multinational corporation (MNC)
is perhaps the most powerful.”15
A deep scholarly literature describes the regulatory difficulties
that arise when misconduct becomes multinational in scope.16 A
variety of scholars from different academic disciplines have
challenged the traditional public law framework that classically
permeates scholarly analyses of regulation.17 These scholars analyze
private law’s potential as a substitute for, or helpmate to, public law in
14. Backer, supra note 4, at 1745.
15. David Antony Detomasi, The Multinational Corporation and Global Governance:
Modelling Global Policy Networks, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 321, 321 (2007); see also Peter J. Spiro,
Constraining Global Corporate Power, 46 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1101, 1103 (2013) (“To the
extent that states are less able to regulate them, then, globalization empowers multinational
corporations”).
16. See, e.g., PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 123-72
(1999); Steven Lukes, Five Fables About Human Rights, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (Stephen
Shute & Susan Harley eds., 1993); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 446 (2001).
17. Backer, supra note 4, at 1745–1746 (citing SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 1128-43(2004); Mitchell F. Crusto, Green
Business: Should We Revoke Corporate Charters for Environmental Violations?, 63 LA. L.
REV. 175, 241 (2003); A.J. Natale, Expansion of Parent Corporate Shareholder Liability
Through the Good Samaritan Doctrine: A Parent Corporation’s Duty to Provide a Safe
Workplace for Employees of its Subsidiary, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 717, 734-36 (1988)).
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situations “[w]here regulation does not exist (in form or fact), or where
markets in law break down or are inefficient.”18 Among other things,
scholars pursuing this kind of research agenda study how and when
private actors19—including corporations, civil society, the media, and
individuals—separately and together can create a system of rulemaking and rule-enforcement that may be more effective than public
lawmaking standing alone.20
A significant amount of scholarly research along these lines has
recently been published in the transnational corporate law and business
literatures. For instance, many projects have examined the potential of
supply chain contracting to serve as an effective private regulatory
mechanism.21 The hypothesis being tested in the supply-chain
literature involves the potential of contracts to impact positively the
labor conditions enjoyed by persons working in suppliers’ factories
located in developing economies where serious human rights
violations occur with depressing frequency.22 Specifically, companies
at the top of supply chains arguably can regulate others in the chain by
insisting on contractual commitments by their suppliers that they
undertake to provide better and safer working conditions than they
18. Backer, supra note 4, at 1749.
19. Larry Catá Backer suggests there are four principal actors who function separately
and in tandem as private regulators: (1) corporations and other enterprises; (2) civil society,
primarily economic and human rights NGOs, (3) the media, and (4) consumers (of both media
and market goods). Id. at 1748–49.
20. Id. at 1749; Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Transnational Corporations and Public
Accountability, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 234, 245–57 (2004) (detailing the efforts to regulate
corporations globally by states, international organizations, NGOs, and corporations
themselves); Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in the Global
Economy, U.N. RES. INST. FOR SOC. DEV. 1 (Apr. 2001) (describing the historic development
of corporate codes); Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Codes of Conduct to the Next
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 4–5 (2005) (describing emergence of corporate codes of
conduct); Spiro, supra note 15, at 1104-09 (describing private regulatory approaches to
disciplining transnational corporate behavior). But see Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of NonState Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 31, 33 (criticizing the notion of “non-state governance”
as “conceptually,” “empirically” and “normatively unattractive”).
21. See, e.g., RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER:
PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013); Richard M. Locke, Can
Global Brands Create Just Supply Chains?, BOSTON REV. (May 21, 2013),
http://bostonreview.net/forum/can-global-brands-create-just-supply-chains-richard-locke;
Kish Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747 (2014); Spiro,
supra note 15 (noting generally that “voluntary initiatives have come under fire for a lack of
enforcement architecture” and specifically citing workplace tragedies in Bangladesh that
revealed weaknesses in supply chain regulatory initiatives).
22. See, e.g., Tansy Hoskins, Supply chain audits fail to detect abuses, says report, THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
14,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2016/jan/14/supply-chain-audits-failing-detect-abuses-report; Locke, supra note 21.
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would be legally required to provide within their home jurisdictions.
Such private contractual provisions can, in theory, fill public
regulatory gaps at the supplier end of the chain.23 Whether in fact this
form of private regulation is feasible or effective at offsetting public
regulatory failures is debatable,24 but it has been embraced as a serious
alternative in situations where public regulation is especially
unrealistic.25
In the field of environmental law, too, analysis of private
contracts reveals the potential for private parties to regulate their
contracting partners via the contract relationship. Professor Michael
Vandenberg, a leading scholar in this area, reports on “recent empirical
research” suggesting that a variety of private regulatory initiatives are
positively affecting “environmental behavior and environmental
quality.”26
Vandenbergh has described the practice wherein contracting
parties incorporate public law environmental standards as terms of
their private agreements, such as in credit agreements and insurance
policies.27 These provisions typically make it a contractual condition
for borrowers or insureds to comply with environmental regulations –
and sometimes with even stricter standards than those already required
by law.28 The existence of such contractual provisions, Vandenbergh
argues, means that the party imposing the requirement “has incentives
to ensure that [the party subject to it] does not violate the law or engage

23. See, e.g., Parella, supra note 21 (criticizing current approaches for failing to take into
account misaligned incentives of suppliers and their MNE buyers and suggesting alternatives
that incorporate some elements of traditional public legal regulation).
24. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 4, at 1739-84.
25. Recent events, such as the Rana Plaza tragedy, suggest that dangerous workplace
conditions pose a real threat to vulnerable workers worldwide. See Jana Kasperkevic, Rana
Plaza collapse: workplace dangers persist three years later, reports find, THE GUARDIAN
(May 31, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/31/rana-plaza-bangladeshcollapse-fashion-working-conditions. See also, e.g., John G. Ruggie, Commentary: Quo
Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors, INS’T. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS & BUS. (Sept. 9, 2014) (discussing contentious debate over multilateral treaty on topic
of business and human rights); Larry Catá Backer, Regulating Multinational Corporations:
Trends, Challenges, and Opportunities, 22 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 1, 3 (2015) (same).
26. Michael Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV.129,
139 (2013).
27. Michael Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,
2030-32 (2005).
28. Id. at 2045 (“A sample of the credit agreements filed with the SEC suggests that firms
filed more than 1,500 in 2001, and more than 70% of these credit agreements include
environmental provisions.”).
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in liability creating behavior.”29 While it is unclear, as an empirical
matter, how frequently lenders actually insist on influencing borrowers
to comply (or not) with environmental obligations, “it is clear that
lenders have incentives to select low-risk borrowers, and often have
incentives to demand regulatory compliance or over-compliance
during the term of the loan. As a result, in many instances lenders have
incentives to engage in traditionally public regulatory functions,
including monitoring and enforcement, implementation, standard
setting, and dispute resolution.”30 “Lenders also include provisions in
credit agreements that establish their right to monitor debtors during
the term of the loan and to enforce regulatory compliance (e.g., by
declaring noncompliance to be a breach of representation and an event
of default).”31
As research across disciplines develops, debate is only
intensifying on the basic question of whether and how contracting can
become a feasible mechanism for addressing transnational regulatory
gaps across the board.32 Yet, it is clear that some forms of private
regulation are increasingly being viewed as serious alternatives to
public regulation—particularly in contexts where public regulation is
especially unrealistic.33
Contracts between corporate sponsors and international sporting
organizations have the potential to serve a similar regulatory function.
The financial dependence of FIFA34 and the IOC35 on large
corporate sponsors means that, at least in theory, sponsors may have
29. Id. at 2052.
30. Id. at 2053.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Locke, supra note 21 (concluding that, “[d]espite many good faith efforts
over the past fifteen years, private regulation has had limited impact”); Parella, supra note 21
(criticizing current approaches for failing to take into account misaligned incentives of
suppliers and their MNE buyers and suggesting alternatives that incorporate some elements of
traditional public legal regulation).
33. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 4.
34. Corporate sponsors have served as a major source of cash for FIFA, which earned
$1.6 billion from sponsorship money in the four years leading up to the 2014 World Cup. Mike
Esterl, FIFA’s Corporate Sponsors Welcome Resignation of Sepp Blatter, WALL ST. J. (June
2, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/fifas-corporate-sponsors-welcome-resignation-of-seppblatter-1433277626 (“Sponsors also spend money on TV ads on networks around the world
that air soccer matches. Overall, FIFA took in $5.72 billion in the 2014 cycle.”).
35. Jere Longman, Potential Olympic Sponsors Said to Be Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21,
1999)
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/21/sports/olympics-potential-olympic-sponsorssaid-to-be-uneasy.html (noting that sponsor money was critical to the ability of the United
States to stage a full Winter Olympics).
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significant leverage they can choose to utilize to combat corrupt
behavior.36 Case studies suggest that this does sometimes, but not
often, occur.
II. CASE STUDIES: RESPONSES OF CORPORATE SPONSORS TO
CORRUPTION SCANDALS IN THE IOC AND FIFA
Two of the most high-profile international sports organizations –
the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”)37 and the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”)38 – have been the
subject of numerous corruption scandals over the past decades. Just
last spring, allegations emerged that bribery may have helped to secure
Tokyo’s winning bid for the 2020 Summer Olympics.39 While the
suspicions of bribery ultimately proved unfounded, the allegations
brought back memories of the scandal that rocked the 2002 Salt Lake
City Games, in which members of the IOC took bribes from the Salt
Lake Organizing Committee (“SLOC”) in the form of direct payments,
land purchase agreements, tuition payments, and political campaign
and charitable donations.40 Ultimately, twenty IOC members were

36. To the extent that such leverage exists in fact, it might be written into the contracts
that structure the sponsorship relationship, as in some of the examples from other fields
discussed above, or, alternatively, might be exercised as part of that ongoing relationship
outside its written terms. See infra Part 3 (arguing that regulatory influence by a stronger
contracting partner may exist even when the contract terms do not reflect it. The formal
contract terms in these contracts may, however, get in the way); see also Pammela S. Quinn,
Regulation in the Shadows of Private Law, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. __ (forthcoming
2017) (describing how the regulatory relationship between contracting parties might not be
reflected in the terms of the formal contract).
37. The IOC is an international NGO organized “in the form of an association with the
status of a legal person, recognized by the Swiss Federal Council in accordance with an
agreement entered into on 1 November 2000. Its seat is in Lausanne (Switzerland), the
Olympic capital. The object of the IOC is to fulfill the mission, role and responsibilities as
assigned to it by the Olympic Charter.” INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., Olympic Charter, at 31 (Aug.
2,
2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.143403894.2109143337.1484936426.
38. FIFA “is an association governed by Swiss law founded in 1904 and based in Zurich.
It has 211 member associations and its goal, enshrined in its Statutes, is the constant
improvement of football.” FIFA, About FIFA: Who We Are, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/who-we-are/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
39. Japan Investigators Say No Bribery in Tokyo Olympic Payment, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37243012.
40. Stephanie Grimes, Five Biggest Scandals in Winter Olympic History, L.V. REV.-J.
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/5-biggest-scandals-winter-olympichistory.
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either expelled or sanctioned.41
FIFA endured its own recent corruption scandal after allegations
of bribery emerged in the selection of host countries for two upcoming
World Cups. Ultimately, dozens of FIFA executives, including those
at the very top of the organization, were indicted by the United States
Department of Justice.42
In the case of each of these scandals, corporate sponsors played a
role in the response to the breaking allegations of corruption. In both
cases, a few sponsors took action while most did not. Notably,
however, with respect to those sponsors that did choose to act, the
types of actions taken have varied fairly broadly.
Corporate Sponsors’ Responses to the IOC Bribery Scandal
When the bidding scandal over the 2002 Salt Lake City Games
emerged, the John Hancock Life Insurance Company’s CEO David
D’Alessandro publicly demanded resignations of various IOC
members including the IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch.43 In
making such demands, John Hancock did not simply terminate its
relationship or pull its sponsoring dollars. Instead, the company took
other concrete measures, such as taking the Olympics logo off of
Hancock’s billboards and other advertising and, perhaps most
significantly, freezing its purchase of $20 million in advertising during
the NBC 2000 Summer Olympics coverage.44
A few sponsors cited the scandal as part of decisions not to renew
sponsorship deals.45 In addition, while the scandal was unfolding, there
were reports that two potential Salt Lake City sponsors were skittish
and refusing to finalize deals.46
For the most part, however, sponsors were largely quiet while the
scandal was unfolding.47 When John Hancock’s decision to suspend
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066.
43. Sandomir, supra note 8.
44. Id.
45. Ameet Sachdev, Sponsors Say Scandal Didn’t Stain Olympics, CHI. TRIB., (Sept. 5,
2000), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-09-05/business/0009050022_1_ioc-sydneygames-winter-games (noting that IBM ended its 38-year relationship with the Olympics and
that the scandal had affected UPS’s analysis of whether to renew).
46. Longman, supra note 37.
47. See, e.g., Stephen Wilson, Olympic Games: Salt Lake Inquiry Implicates 24, THE
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 11, 1999), https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympic-games-salt-
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advertising negotiations was made public, the IOC’s Marketing
Director Michael Payne was quick to report that Olympic sponsors
were generally standing with the IOC during the crisis. Payne asserted
that sponsors remained not just committed to the Olympic Games but
also “are standing . . . behind the steps and action the IOC, Samaranch
and the executive board are taking [in response to the bribery
inquiry].”48
Corporate Sponsors’ Responses to the FIFA Corruption Scandal
The responses of sponsors in connection with the recent FIFA
scandal were even more muted. Perhaps the most significant response
was the refusal of two of FIFA’s “big six”49 sponsors (Sony and
Emirates) to renew their sponsorship deals in 2014.50 A few other
major sponsors, namely Visa and Coca-Cola, made public statements
calling on FIFA to take action to resolve its corruption problems.51
For the most part, however, FIFA sponsors have been criticized
for their lack of response to the corruption scandal and, even with
respect to those that did take action, with the lukewarm nature of the
responses. Neither Sony nor Emirates discussed or cite directly the
corruption scandal in announcing their decisions not to renew

lake-inquiry-implicates-24-1070165.html.
48. Id.
49. Nearly half of FIFA’s sponsorship dollars comes from just six top sponsoring
companies. Esterl, supra note 11.
50. Sony terminated its sponsorship worth $277 million “saying the expense of
sponsorship may become a burden in the future for the technology company.” Polly Mosendz,
Sony Drops FIFA Sponsorship Amid Corruption Scandal, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:31
PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/sony-drops-fifa-sponsorship-amid-corruption-scandal288443; Emirates indicated that it would be interested in renewing its sponsorship deal once
the corruption issues had been dealt with. Emirates Keen on Sponsoring Fifa Once Corruption
Scandal Is Cleared Up, THE NATIONAL (June 10, 2016, 12:48 PM),
http://www.thenational.ae/business/aviation/emirates-keen-on-sponsoring-fifa-oncecorruption-scandal-is-cleared-up (“‘I’d like to think that when it’s all sorted out we get back
in because it’s great for us, we’re so football orientated,’ [Emirates President] said.”); Other
“second-tier” sponsors followed suit. Scandal-hit FIFA lose three more major sponsors.
Gibson, supra note 12. (“Three of Fifa’s sponsors during the 2014 World Cup in Brazil have
joined Sony and Emirates in declining to renew their contracts with the scandal-hit world
governing body. Castrol, Continental Tyres and Johnson & Johnson – so-called second-tier
sponsors that had a high-profile presence in Brazil – have confirmed they have not renewed
their deals.”).
51. Alexander Smith, FIFA Corruption Scandal: Sponsors Visa, Coca-Cola Express
Concern, NBC NEWS (May 28, 2015, 6:41 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fifacorruption-scandal/visa-coca-cola-mcdonalds-are-extremely-concerned-fifa-scandaln365806.
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sponsorship deals.52 Nor did critics like Visa and Coca-Cola take any
financial action or threaten any.53
III. THE PITFALLS OF REGULATION BY CORPORATE SPONSORS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS ARENA
The lack of response is in some tension with the significant
potential of corporate sponsors to exert influence in this context, as
discussed in some detail in Part I above. Both the IOC and FIFA are
heavily financially dependent on their sponsors.54 The threat of lost
sponsorship dollars was a threat that seems to have exerted real
influence over the IOC in resolving the Salt Lake City scandal.55 Yet,
the ability of sponsors to exert this influence is undermined by several
significant obstacles, which likely explains the muted responses in
both cases described in Part II.
First, it has been speculated that FIFA sponsors whose contracts
were not up for renewal may have been contractually prevented from
withdrawing sponsorship or making strong public statements
condemning the scandal as it was unfolding.56 According to this
account, it is the corporate sponsors, not the sporting organization,
whose behavior is more likely to be regulated by the contractual
relationships between them.
Although sponsorship contracts almost certainly have so-called
“morals clauses” that would provide sponsors with the right to
withdraw should certain types of scandals emerge, some experts have
suggested that such clauses might not cover scandals in which
individuals rather than the organization are the focus.57 That is, “[e]ven
52. Mosendz, supra note 54.
53. Phil Rosenthal, FIFA scandal statement: Visa, McDonald’s, others don’t run, won’t
kick,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE
(May
29,
2015,
5:31
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/columnists/ct-rosenthal-fifa-corruption-0531-biz20150529-column.html; Darren Rovell, Corporate Sponsors yet to drop FIFA amid
corruption investigations, ESPN FC (May 27, 2015), http://www.espnfc.us/fifa-worldcup/story/2469265/corporate-sponsors-yet-to-drop-fifa-amid-corruption-probe.
54. See de Moraes, supra note 7 & accompanying text.
55. Larry Siddons, IOC expels six members in Salt Lake City scandal, THE GUARDIAN
(March 17, 1999, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/1999/mar/17/ioc-expelsmembers-bribes-scandal; see also Alex Altman, The Real Story of Romney’s Olympic
Turnaroud, TIME (July 18, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/07/18/the-real-story-ofromneys-olympic-turnaround/ (discussion about Romney being hailed for bringing in so many
sponsor dollars in the aftermath of the scandal).
56. Gosh, supra note 6.
57. Id.
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if multiple individuals are convicted, that may not be enough to trigger
a morals clause.”58 More than likely, the contracts are drafted to be
friendly to the organization and the morals clauses may be drafted to
require “a criminal conviction actually involving” the organization.59
Further, even if the clauses are not clear-cut in this respect, if there
is an argument that a morals clause is not clearly triggered, the risk
may seem to be too great for sponsors to undertake. If they are wrong
in interpreting the morals clause to apply in a given case, there might
“be significant financial consequences” in the form of potential
“damages for breach of contract”—perhaps even equal to the value of
the entire deal.60 The risk for the most financially invested would be
the highest, thus handicapping those sponsors with the most potential
influence.
Second, the financial stakes may seem particularly high to
sponsors given the lack of a clear upside to staking out a critical
position. With respect to the FIFA scandal, Professor Jeroen
Weijermars claims that
consumers also seem to be quite indifferent. The Dutch press
suggested that consumers stop buying any product sponsoring FIFA as
a sign of rejection, but nothing happened. Moreover, consumers
quickly forget: at the next World Cup, the ball will be put into play and
it will again be one of the greatest sporting events.61
He notes that, in general, “studies that show negative publicity
causes little damage to a sponsor’s brand value.”62
Given the probability that brand value will suffer little, sponsors
may feel they are standing in a sweet spot if they take some steps to
signal disapproval but not so much that they trigger the ire of the
organization and a threatened action for breach. This is particularly
true given the increasing importance many companies place on being
viewed as a good corporate citizen.63 “A combination of media
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Jeroen Weijermars, The sponsors’ reaction to FIFA case, JOHAN CRUYFF INST.: THE
MAGAZINE, (June 02, 2015) http://johancruyffinstitute.com/en/blog-en/the-sponsors-reactionto-fifa-case/.
62. Id.
63. See Sarah Dadush, Profiting in (RED): The Need for Enhanced Transparency in
Cause-Related Marketing, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1269, 1278 (2010) (discussing the
importance of a company’s boosting its corporate social responsibility image and its sales).
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pressure, social media commentary, and ‘sophisticated’ understanding
of [corporate social responsibility (“CSR”)] means few of the brands
are willing to stay completely quiet.”64 All of this is in line with the
reality that “[s]ome sponsors have been more vocal than you’d expect,
publicly.”65
Third, structural obstacles may make it difficult for many if not
most companies to do more. As noted above, strict contract provisions
in FIFA sponsor contracts may tie the hands of sponsors to do much.
To the extent there is little brand tarnishment associated with these
scandals, the organization may stay in the driver’s seat in terms of
contract negotiations – especially in situations where there are
sponsors lined up to take a spot if one drops out. While sponsors may
find themselves in a position to demand contract provisions that give
them more power in the wake of a scandal—as several companies
apparently did with the IOC at the tail end of the Salt Lake City
scandal—this position may have changed significantly by the time the
next renewal period comes around. Ultimately, unless brand
tarnishment through association becomes a real issue, sponsors may
not wield as much authority as their dollar contributions suggest they
should.
The CEO of John Hancock has also spoken directly to the issue
of organizational obstacles that stand in the way of sponsors’ ability to
exert real regulatory pressure, claiming that his background, which put
him in a unique position to take the stance he did vis-à-vis the IOC
during the Salt Lake City scandal, is unusual for a high-ranking
corporate official.66 Specifically, he claims that sports sponsorship
contracting is typically run out of divisions within a company headed
by middle managers who are unlikely to have the status or incentives
necessary to advocate for harsh sanctions.67 Moreover, unlike
D’Alessandro himself who did exactly this, those who serve in those
middle management jobs and have the expertise and knowledge of
sponsorship deals generally do not move up the company “food chain”
to positions where they might achieve such status.68
64. Gosh, supra note 6.
65. Id. (“It’s a trend that sponsors have become more prepared to stick their heads above
the parapet and actively engage with the public conversation.”) (quoting Nick Johnson, board
director for the European Sponsorship Association).
66. Sachdev, supra note 49 (noting that David D’Alessandro, John Hancock’s CEO, was
the most critical corporate backer of the IOC after the Salt Lake City scandal).
67. Sandomir, supra note 8.
68. Id.
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Finally, even when they are in such a position to do something,
sponsors’ regulatory efforts may not be as public as John Hancock’s
were. Behind the scenes action may be deemed more effective—but
would be hard to identify or measure.69 In general, both sides are likely
to understand that “it could do more harm than good for the sponsors
to quit” altogether and rescind their affiliation with the sporting
organization.70 Where they maintain established relationships, they
maintain leverage or influence. “[I]t’s going to be easier for them to
work within existing parameters than for any new sponsor coming
in.”71 Both the organization and sponsor may also be aware that the
impact of sponsors’ potential departures might be muted or mooted to
the extent competitors are easily lined up to take their spots.72 For
instance, Emirates’ departure as a FIFA sponsor was quickly
overshadowed by news that Qatar Airlines was already in line to take
its place.73
CONCLUSION
John Hancock’s efforts to push the IOC to take action to clean
house in the wake of the Salt Lake City bribery scandal appear to have
been very effective at pushing the IOC to do just that. Unfortunately,
the lack of broader sponsor efforts at that time, and tepid responses to
the FIFA scandal, may reflect the existence of various impediments to
effective corporate regulation of corruption more generally. While the
success of John Hancock should encourage those who are looking for
glimmers of hope in a difficult to regulate space, unpacking what made
it successful and contrasting with more typical responses reveals that
it is certainly no panacea or magic solution to lean more on the
corporate sponsor community to combat corruption by these
organizations.

69. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 55.
70. Gosh, supra note 6.
71. Id. (quoting Johnson).
72. For example, as of July 2015, only months after the departure of major sponsors such
as Emirates during the FIFA corruption scandal, Qatar Airways reported that it was in latter
stages of negotiating a sponsorship agreement with FIFA (as a replacement for Emirates).
Flanagan, supra note 13.
73. Id.

